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ABSTRACT 
The Scandal in Academia is a large-scale fictional ethical case 
study of around 17,000 words and fourteen separate revelations.  
They are delivered as newspaper extracts from a newspaper 
reporting on an ongoing crisis at a Scottish educational 
institution.     The scandal case study as presented in its original 
form comes with only limited commentary on the ethical issues 
raised, concentrating instead on providing the scenario in 
isolation.  This paper is a companion piece to that case study, 
discussing the third and fourth revelations with reference to the 
issues raised, the mainstream media, and the formal academic 
literature.  The discussion presented here is not intended to be 
exhaustive or definitive.  It is instead indicative of an approach 
that could be taken within a formal educational context, and 
illustrative of the kind of discussions that ideally emerge from the 
effective use of the material.   
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
K.7.4 [Professional Ethics]: Codes of ethics; Codes of good 
practice; Ethical dilemmas. 
General Terms 
Security; Human Factors; Legal Aspects 
Keywords 
Ethics; Morality; Professional Issues; Human Factors; Killer 
Robot; Academia; Case Study  
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Scandal in Academia [11] is an extended case study intended 
for use as a teaching and discussion aid for educational 
practitioners looking to introduce elements of computer ethics 
into their curricula.  Computer ethics instruction is an important 
element of gaining accreditation for many professional 
organisations [5], and offers an opportunity to discuss important 
social trends.  Inspired by Epstein’s seminal Case of the Killer 
Robot [8][9][10], the Scandal in Academia is a full-cycle scenario 
involving many individuals examined via an extended case-study 
which touches upon the complexity and interrelations of modern 
computer ethics.  However, while it has been trialed and evaluated 
as a teaching tool by the authors [13] its utility as a general 
resource is limited without the academic context that supports 
deeper investigation of the material.  It is to address this issue that 
the authors offer a commentary on the scandal, with a focus on the 
third and fourth newspaper items presented within.   This paper 
then should be considered a companion to [11] and cannot be 
fully understood without reference to the original. 
 
In these articles, we are introduced to some of the context of 
Professor Blackbriar’s research work, and the likely financial 
consequences if the allegations levied against him are true.   We 
discover that his research has informed the development of several 
important collaborations, and that there have been millions of 
pounds invested into work that directly draws from the 
conclusions of his research.    We also hear from the postgraduate 
students who were suspended from the university, and the tales 
they tell of academic serfdom and the power of social contexts.  
They discuss the importance of playing politics when dealing with 
a respected colleague and the impact that preferment from the 
same may have on their future careers.     
In these articles we encounter a large number of important issues:  
The issue of corporate influence in academia, and the impact of 
academia on industry;  the risks of speculative ‘casino’ investment 
on the basis of uncorroborated research; the mental biases that 
impact on good decision making;  the management of workplace 
relations and the power differentials such relations imply; the role 
of the postgraduate student in modern academic structures; closed 
data sets and the publication imperative; workplace bullying; and 
issues of the accessibility of information resources. 
As with the previous analysis we have published regarding the 
first two articles of the scandal we make no claim that this is the 
only interpretation that can be placed on the material.  Readers are 
invited, indeed – encouraged, to disagree with any and all of the 
commentary we provide.   This is not intended to be a definitive 
analysis, but an illustrative one.  As with the original paper, we 
also provide the disclaimer that while this discussion is informed 
by our real life experiences, none of the institutions where we 
have worked are directly referenced.    
2. ACADEMIC AND CORPORATE  
Within the article ‘Multimillion Pound Consequences for 
Research Fiddle’ [11, p25], the Scandal in Academia discusses 
the relationship between the University of Dunglen and its 
industrial partners in the North Sea.    We find out that there is a 
great, and growing, worry that the North Sea Algorithmic 
Exploration (NSAE) project may have based much of its future 
planning on research data that has become suspect.  There is talk 
of lawsuits being levelled at everyone involved.  It’s an awkward 
situation and one with potential professional and personal 
consequences for a large number of partners. 
The tensions between industrial and educational research policies 
and philosophies are a long standing, on-going issue.  Ethical 
standards, levels of confidence, and requirements for 
corroboration all vary enormously within academic disciplines; 
within research practitioners within disciplines; and within the 
interfaces between university departments and faculties.  
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Expectation of authorship on papers may not be shared by all and 
the level of assumed contribution before co-authorship is 
conceded may create tensions. Within academia itself, 
collaboration can be politically vexatious.  When industrial 
collaborations are incorporated into this, the problems magnify 
because not only do large industrial partners suffer from the same 
issues, they also approach the matter from an often completely 
different perspective.  Thus, in addition to internecine conflict 
within organisations there is an external conflict at the interfaces 
between groups.   No matter the will to collaborate or the mutual 
respect that may be found on both sides, a lack of common ground 
can create difficulties, and these in turn can lead to violations of 
cultural and professional norms when the work is to be published.  
Issues of commercial sensitivity, for example, are anathema to 
principles of free academic disclosure.      
Within academia, the differentiation between ‘research’ and 
‘teaching’ is usually well observed – as a matter of course, 
academic research is not conducted directly on students unless it 
is educational in nature.   Research projects are clearly demarked, 
at least in theory, and have formal start and termination points.   
The funding for academic research is most often provided by 
external bodies and this places an emphasis on clearly delimiting 
activities for the purposes of economic auditing and 
accountability.   University governing bodies require strict 
adherence to ethical codes of conduct, and research which 
involves working with real people at any time will be scrutinised 
for its conformance with overall university codes of practices.  It 
is usually possible then, within a university, to point at a body of 
work and say ‘This forms part of this distinct research project, 
which was led by this individual, and funded by this external body 
in this particular way’ 
Within industry, these distinctions can become blurred – there is a 
fine line between ‘improving a process’ and ‘testing a hypothesis’.  
Consider for example the widely publicized case of Facebook’s 
‘experiments’ over the emotional impact of news feeds on their 
users1. Much heat was generated as a result of Facebook, in 
collaboration with university academics, publishing some 
conclusions they had drawn from what was essentially a large 
scale experiment on human subjects through modification of the 
Facebook news feed.   Commentators variously described the 
research as unethical, noble, deceptive or as a violation of privacy.   
Leaving aside the efficacy or value of the research itself [26], 
which is disputed - what is most clear about this incident is the 
differing expectation of what research actually involves within an 
industrial context.  Within academia, ethics forms would be 
submitted, funding obtained, proposals scrutinised before being 
approved, and the results would be submitted to a journal for full 
peer review, followed by an affirmation that sector norms for 
ethical conduct had been observed.   Within Facebook, and other 
large scale industry organisations, it is a common part of day to 
day practice to engage in repeated and regular A/B testing on 
cohorts to improve, for some given value, the interaction 
1 For example: 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jun/30/facebook-
emotion-study-breached-ethical-guidelines-researchers-say, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/06/28/facebook-
manipulated-689003-users-emotions-for-science/, and 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/30/technology/facebook-
tinkers-with-users-emotions-in-news-feed-experiment-stirring-
outcry.html?_r=0  
experience for all.   That testing may involve adjusting the load 
order of dynamic web elements, changing the algorithms used to 
retrieve information, or altering the precedence given to 
information as it is presented.   The agility that industrial 
organisations can muster for this in many ways determines their 
ability to keep pace with their competitors, especially in fast 
moving fields such as computing.   For most corporations the 
results of such testing are usually kept internal and employees are 
bound by their existing employment contracts and codes of 
conduct.    The tension arises when this research transgresses this 
‘invisible’ boundary and interfaces with both academia and the 
public.  The Facebook research was published in the Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Science of the United States of 
America (PNAS) as a collaboration between Facebook, the 
University of California and Cornell University.  The PNAS has 
as one of their submission criteria a requirement that research is 
conducted according to the Declaration of Helsinki2 – this is 
where the offence lies, because the research does not meet that 
criteria.  Had the research never been published however, there 
would have likely been no outcry.   Within large organisations, 
such ‘research’ is largely just a part and parcel of an ongoing 
adjustment and refactoring of internal systems.   
For academics, access to large and restricted data sets can be 
seductive – the original paper [26] had a sample size of just over 
689,000 users.  It simply would not be possible for an academic 
partner, acting in isolation, to recruit so many people to a trial.   
For industrial partners, the credibility of a respected academic 
collaborator can burnish up results, as well as ensure that they are 
presented, analysed and contextualised according to the rigorous 
expectations of primary research publications.    Drafting research 
for academic outlets is a specialised skill, and requires familiarity 
with the linguistic conventions not just of the discipline, but the 
editorial policies of the journal or conference and the wider sector 
beyond. 
Consent for participation in such internal research is usually 
permitted as part of a blanket acceptance of terms and conditions 
on the part of the users.  In the case of the Facebook study, there 
is some evidence to suggest that consent for research was added to 
the user agreement after the research had been conducted3 but in 
most cases a blanket exemption is in place that covers the service 
provider for a wide range of activities.   This in itself is a shallow 
defense, given how few people read the terms and conditions and 
how explicitly impenetrable they are often made to be [28].   Core 
to the objection that many have had to the research is that while it 
may be consent in its simplest, most shallow form, it doesn’t meet 
the criteria for informed consent which has gradually become the 
academic consensus since the Second World War [40].    
Industrial bodies, such as Facebook, are rarely bound by formal 
codes of conduct or even institutional review boards (IRBs) that 
sanction studies, even those involving human participants.   
Universities, on the other hand, have a more institutionally 
2 See https://www.sciencebasedmedicine.org/did-facebook-and-
pnas-violate-human-research-protections-in-an-unethical-
experiment/ and 
http://codingconduct.tumblr.com/post/90242838320/frame-
clashes-or-why-the-facebook-emotion 
3 http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/06/30/facebook-
only-got-permission-to-do-research-on-users-after-emotion-
manipulation-study/  
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rigorous infrastructure for reviewing the ethical implications of 
research. 
However, the tensions of corporate influence in academia extend 
beyond simply differences in expectations of ethical consent.   
One of the primary ways in which industry partners with academia 
is through the route of funding or sponsorship.    We discussed the 
impact of commercial interests in our first paper on the Scandal 
[11, p47], but we also have to consider the powerful influences 
that corporate money can have on academic freedom.   While 
there are real world limits on just how far academic freedom 
stretches, it is in general considered to be a principle worth 
defending.  Support for the principle though is tempered.  There 
exist tensions – for example, advocates of Intelligent Design as a 
scientific principle have sometimes claimed to find it difficult to 
obtain advancement in their institutions.  It is hard though to 
unpick in such cases the ratio of academic suppression as 
compared to the self-correcting nature of the scientific process.   
Within the United Kingdom, the Education Reform Act of 1988 
codified academic freedom as a guiding principle for higher 
education institutes.  While the right is under legal protection that 
does not prevent industrial partners from leveraging the power 
differential implied by funding to suppress results or encourage 
undue prominence being given to minority views that coincide 
with their economic interests.    Corporate interests can result in 
delays on publication, or harmful secrecy clauses on results 
obtained [27].  They can result in papers or reports with written 
conclusions that are contrary to an analysis of the data, because it 
is the introduction and conclusion to which many popular press 
outlets will refer.   They can result in academics acting in part as 
the Public Relations arm for corporate influence within specialist 
publications.  Consider for example the role played by Stossel in 
[6].  The support of an academic, or their institutional brand, can 
bolster the reputation of an organisation.  Such bolstering may be 
worth the cost if it can be leveraged effectively. 
Fairly or unfairly, the source of funding for research has become 
as important an element of full disclosure as data-sets and 
methods.  There is an element of backlash against this 
expectation, alleging it has become a tool through which vested 
interests can undermine unpopular research and that this in turn 
hinders progress [36].  Stossel is quoted in [22] as saying the 
following: 
Disclosure policies are no longer a way to 
honour the sponsor of a study, but rather 
they have been turned into a type of 
confession.  In practise, disclosures are 
being used by the media to embarrass people.   
We have gone from bad to worse.  We have 
immense regulatory issues and massive 
confessions where we disclose our 
relationships to industry and those are used 
to initiate a variety of inhibitions of 
freedom of speech, freedom of association, 
and rewards for excellence. 
However, a critic may argue only that which is commonly 
considered to be shameful can be used to embarrass, and if a 
relationship with a funder is shameful then it is symptomatic of 
the often incestuous relationship between industry and academia.  
The now infamous Paxil Study 329 [23] [41] liberally selected 
from those data points most likely to show a positive result of the 
medication under review.  In this respect, the principal 
investigator for this is very similar to our own Professor 
Blackbriar who has adjusted the data of his own research in part 
to assuage the powerful corporate interests who have been 
funding his work. 
3. MENTAL BIASES 
In our case study though we are not talking about how corporate 
sponsorship may violate the principles of academic research, but 
instead about how academic research may undermine the work of 
industry.   Here we have an experimental algorithm which has 
been incorporated into a large scale industrial project, and it’s not 
giving the results people are hoping for.  A lot is riding on the 
success of the project, and that success is highly tied up in the 
question of whether or not the Blackbriar Algorithm works at all.   
It’s easy for an external party to look at some situations that occur 
and think ‘well, the real solution is to not get into that situation in 
the first place’.  This is superficially compelling, but ignores the 
vast array of factors that result in bad decisions being made.  In 
teaching computer ethics, the first task we have as educators is to 
disabuse students of the idea that it’s all ‘just common sense’ 
[13].  We must counter the idea that we are immune to the 
psychological and social factors that influence others.  In fact, the 
belief that we are somehow calmer and more rational than others 
is in itself a demonstration of the cognitive biases under which 
our minds labour.  This particular bias is called illusory 
superiority [19]. Most of us believe, regardless of the evidence to 
the contrary, that we are above average – that what impacts on 
others will not impact on us quite so intensely.     
The human mind is a remarkable tool, honed by evolution to a 
fine point.  However, it is also a product of our historical context, 
and as such it contains not only the cognitive architecture that we 
need for human society as it is now, but as it was hundreds of 
thousands of years ago.   The human subconscious is also a 
tremendous filter, protecting our conscious mind from the vast 
amount of information our senses pull in on a second by second 
basis.   As part of that apparatus, there is a need for our mind to 
balance cognitive overload.   Often, this is done through cognitive 
shortcuts that allow us to quickly arrive at a judgement that is 
‘good enough’ for most purposes.   These lead to cognitive biases 
which systematically influence the way in which we think about 
the world.   The collection of these identified biases is 
considerable and many of them are relevant to the issue of why 
people make bad decisions.   
Perhaps most germane to this example is the Sunk Cost effect, or 
what is often known as the Concorde Fallacy [4].  When the 
Concorde was being built, the British and French governments 
continued development long beyond the point where there was a 
reasonable expectation of economic return on the project [2].   So 
much time, effort and political capital had been invested in the 
project that it was inconceivable to simply stop the work.  
However, economic theory argues that when deciding on a future 
investment, sunk costs should be entirely discounted.  They have 
been spent regardless of the success or failure of the project and 
thus should not feature into future decision-making.   This is a 
difficult lesson to internalise for most people, and this difficulty 
leads to what is colloquially known as ‘throwing good money 
after bad’.   After investing so much money into Blackbriar and 
his work, it may have been the case that his funding partners 
simply decided they had invested too much already to abandon 
the project. 
However, this is predicated on an assumed understanding on the 
part of the research partners – it presumes that they understood 
the algorithm as it was presented was a bad investment.   
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However, we have other biases that stop us being able to make 
that rational assessment of complex sets of information. Consider 
for example the confirmation bias – the cognitive shortcut that 
leads us to preferentially seek out (or consciously notice) 
information that supports our existing beliefs [25].   If we believe 
that the algorithm works, we’re more likely to ‘weight’ evidence 
that it works in our mind – even if that evidence is not as strong or 
as common as evidence that it doesn’t.  Likewise, the hindsight 
bias [3] which leads us to a kind of mental revisionism in which 
we believe we had assumed an event was going to happen the way 
it did all along even if we had no way of predicting.  The 
hindsight bias can lead to memory distortions in which we not 
only believed we were right, but remember actively predicting that 
the result would occur.   
There are a lot of funding partners in the NSAE, so we also have 
to consider socially contextual cognitive biases, such as the 
bandwagon effect – that the more we encounter people who 
believe a thing; the more likely we are to believe that thing 
ourselves regardless of the underlying evidence.   That in turn 
leads to a sampling bias where we are mistakenly led to believe 
that those around us are representative of a group at large, even 
though they may be an unusually skewed cluster.   This then can 
lead to groupthink [20], in which presumed consensus acts as a 
barrier to exploration of risks, pitfalls and counter arguments.  Or 
consider the Status Quo bias [24[, where we are more likely to 
accept a situation as it is presented rather than attempt to change 
it.  The latter bias has been manipulated to startling effect in ‘opt-
out’ versus ‘opt-in’ initiatives.  If participants are asked to opt-in 
to an organ donor register, donor rates are about 40%.  If people 
are asked to opt-out, donor rates rise to around 80% [21] because 
most people simply will not tick the ‘opt-out’ box.  The power of 
this effect has been noticed, with many websites requiring that 
you opt-out of receiving their email notifications upon 
registration, as opposed to opting in.  
Even leaving aside these cognitive biases, we can’t discount the 
simple placement or emphasis of information and the role it plays 
in prompting a decision.  Consider for example the two related 
concepts of anchoring [39] and framing [37].  Anchoring refers 
to the technique of setting early expectations in a comparison, and 
framing refers to the selective placement or information as it is 
presented.    A good demonstration of anchoring can be found in 
the donation pages of sites such as Wikipedia or the purchase 
page Humble Bundle4 where you are asked to choose a sum to 
provide, or allowed to select from a series of radio buttons that 
have pre-determined amounts.   This is shown in figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 - Anchoring within the Humble Bundle 
Presenting relatively large default sums anchors our value 
judgement – when we decide to pay a lesser sum, it is a larger 
lesser sum than it would have been if there were no anchoring 
offered at all.   In this way, we are skewed towards paying more 
than we otherwise may have. 
Framing works by offering multiple options at once, with one 
being contextually much better than the others. [1] discusses one 
4 https://www.humblebundle.com/ 
such example of this in relation to the subscription options for the 
Economist: 
I read these offers one at a time. The first 
offer-the Internet subscription for $59 
seemed reasonable. The second option-the 
$125 print subscription-seemed a bit 
expensive, but still reasonable. 
 
But then I read the third option: a print 
and Internet subscription for $125. I read 
it twice before my eye ran back to the 
previous options. Who would want to buy the 
print option alone, I wondered, when both 
the Internet and the print subscriptions 
were offered for the same price? Now, the 
print- only option may have been a 
typographical error, but I suspect that the 
clever people at the Economist‘s London 
offices (and they are clever-and quite 
mischievous in a British sort of way) were 
actually manipulating me. I am pretty 
certain that they wanted me to skip the 
Internet- only option (which they assumed 
would be my choice, since I was reading the 
advertisement on the Web) and jump to the 
more expensive option: Internet and print. 
In this case, the option is framed in such a way as to skew the 
choices people make – they’re more likely to go for Digital + 
Print even if they just want a Digital copy, purely because that 
deal seems like so much better than the Print option alone.  With 
the Print+Digital option, it appears as if digital access is a free 
bonus of having purchased print access.  Such techniques are used 
often in retail to skew people towards a ‘mid-range’ option when 
they may have otherwise have purchased a cheap option.  Often 
this kind of ‘nudging’ is entirely incidental, but it can be used to 
subtly, and powerfully, change the way in which our minds 
analyse the information in front of us.  It is easy to conceive of a 
meeting in which an academic pitches four projects – one 
extremely expensive, one merely very expensive, one cheap, and 
one that is a more middling cost.  If presented each individually, 
the cost may have been prohibitive for all but the cheapest option.  
If presented collectively, or framed, the moderate option becomes 
more attractive because it is seen in comparison to two expensive 
options, rather than assessed on its own merits.   
There are many more of these biases that are relevant to the issue 
of sensible decision making – there’s the Gambler’s Fallacy [38] 
or the IKEA effect [33], or the Optimism Bias [36], or the 
Experimenter’s Bias [34] and many more than we can hope to 
even touch on in this short section.  However, the key point here 
is not that any of these biases were in play, but that they could 
very easily have been in play.  Any one of them would have 
impacted on cool, rational decision making – often without the 
people involved having any idea that there was anything wrong 
with their thought processes.   We often assume that our decisions 
are the result of the calm, sober application of rational analysis.  
To assume such is to ignore the gaping holes in our minds 
through which conscious or unconscious manipulation can enter 
our thinking.  It is easy to judge based on hindsight but in order to 
understand what may happen in the future, we need to be mindful 
of the limitations of our mental architecture.  We need to be aware 
that, if placed in a situation ourselves, we are likely to be subject 
to the same powerful cognitive forces. 
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4. WORKPLACE RELATIONS 
Within these two Scandal in Academia items, we also see the first 
stirrings of the workplace issues that will become important 
themes. Our postgraduate students, Sharon and James have been 
suspended for their presumed roles in the alleged academic 
misconduct, and have told their story to the newspaper in an 
attempt to get their views heard.  What they tell is a tale of 
academic serfdom and the hope of future nepotistic preferment 
because of their relationship with Blackbriar.  What they also do 
is open our eyes to the way in which modern academia sometimes 
utilises transient resources such as postgraduate and postdoctoral 
researchers.    
There is a growing body of what has become known as ‘quit-lit’5 
emerging in the semi-popular educational press.  This term 
broadly encompasses a range of revelatory blog posts, education 
periodical editorials, and social media updates.  As a general 
theme, these revelations cover postgraduate students, postdoctoral 
researchers, and even full time faculty members who have been 
driven to publicly quit their positions as a result of administrative 
pressures, job insecurity, or career ennui.   The stories are not just 
from those who have failed to find success within modern 
academic institutional structures, but also those who have found 
such success and discarded it regardless.   Full quantitative figures 
on the trend are hard to uncover, as unpicking these incidents 
from larger employment trends is a complex task.  It is hard to say 
whether the trend to publish ‘I’m leaving academia’ literature 
reflects an increase in dissatisfaction or simply a decrease in 
discretion.  However, within the body of quit-lit we see many 
views of a dehumanising system of employment and promotion, 
and a research process which prizes funding and quantification 
over longer term scholarship.   Obtaining a permanent position as 
an academic is difficult.  There are some thirty or forty PhD 
graduates being produced for every single academic vacancy, with 
positions at high profile institutions sometimes receiving 
hundreds of applications per job6.  Under such circumstances it is 
only natural that those with transient working contracts will look 
for whatever advantage they can find in their collaborations.  
Getting noticed as a new researcher too is challenging – with little 
track record of individual accomplishment, grant funding is 
difficult to obtain and temporary research contracts usually 
relegate a researcher to second or third authorship.   Attaching 
one’s name to a prominent researcher in the field can be a useful 
way to gain some notice.  A certain amount of professional 
discomfiture might be expected and accepted as the cost of doing 
business.   A kind of ‘competent by association’ impression can 
be generated by your name being attached, via co-authorship, to 
the prominent publications of an academic luminary. 
The growing trend of quantification of research exacerbates this 
issue – assessment exercises such as the Research Excellence 
Framework place considerable weight on algorithmic analyses of 
research output, such as citation counts and H-Index [29].   
Automated tools such as Google Scholar index scholarly 
publications across much of the internet and produce crawled 
citation lists.  These are an easily checked resource for both 
researchers and those looking to employ them.   However, 
5 https://chroniclevitae.com/news/216-why-so-many-academics-
quit-and-tell  
6 http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/news/hundreds-of-phd-
students-chasing-every-early-career-post/2016799.article  
anything quantifiable can almost always also be gamed, and the 
H-Index is no exception.  Those looking to inflate their H-Index 
can easily do so if they are able to publish regularly – self 
citations are often excluded in more comprehensive analyses, but 
not in most of the automatically generated values.   However, that 
kind of engineered ‘citation inflation’ requires a regular stream of 
published papers, and that in turn requires a regular stream of 
insight generated via new work.  Access to a colleague with 
research funding can facilitate this, but usually only for short term 
contracts of two or so years.  It’s exceedingly difficult to plan a 
life around institutional and structural career instability.  The 
emotional toll of this system is often not discussed, but includes 
systemic depression, mental health issues and increased rates of 
illness due to stress.    Researchers report difficulties in balancing 
work and family life, the gradual erosion of vacation time, and 
long, unstainable working hours. 
Talking about these issues is difficult for many – the system as it 
currently stands is not geared up to seriously consider the 
emotional toll of short-termism in research planning.  A full 
solution to the problem would be expensive, and require root and 
branch reform of academic promotion structures, the supply and 
demand of postgraduate researchers, and the way in which 
research funding is competitively allocated. It is easier in many 
cases to simply ignore the problem and hope that the professional 
consequences of disclosure temper revelatory desires.  That is not 
to say the problem is entirely unacknowledged – welcome steps 
are now being taken to openly discuss these issues, but for those 
already suffering the emotional toll it is often too little and too 
late.  
Discussing these issues from a position of career instability is 
risky and requires a considerable degree of personal bravery – not 
only to admit that you need help, but also to ‘speak truth to 
power’.  Power differentials are a common feature of the 
workplace environment, and those in positions of authority may, 
or may not, be aware of the suppression effect those differentials 
may have on those around them.  It is clear from our case study 
that Blackbriar is not reticent in wielding the differential in his 
favour, but for many employers they may simply be so distant 
from the day to day impact of the issue that they are unaware that 
it is choking off dissenting voices.   Career stability and 
professional security are moderators of this problem, but neither 
of those traits can accurately be ascribed to those on a succession 
of research contracts.  This is especially true when every 
extension to the contract is dependent on the will and desire for 
colleagues to seek additional funding for later projects.   As with 
many things, some progress has been made in this area to 
improve, at least legally, the tenuous position of those who are on 
successive fixed-term contracts.  However, institutions have been 
as quick to respond through the use of punctuated contracts or 
zero-hours contracts to ensure that their legal obligation does not 
stifle their organisational flexibility.  As a consequence, postgrads 
and postdocs can come to seem like interchangeable resources.   
The desire to distinguish oneself can lead both to working long 
beyond what could be considered reasonable hours but also for 
the willingness to work those unreasonable hours to be seen as a 
pre-requisite deliverable of scholarly dedication.  After all, if I 
can choose between two otherwise equal research staff members 
where the difference is their willingness to work weekends, why 
wouldn’t I pick the one that ‘goes the extra mile’?   With that in 
mind, how willing might a transient researcher be to rock the boat 
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by kicking up a fuss about the quality of the analysis being 
performed on data sets?   
Principal investigators too are under enormous institutional 
pressures, and one shouldn’t underplay how valuable those ‘free’ 
hours can be to a project.  Similarly, when it comes to providing 
full recognition of contribution, the dynamic can lead to a kind of 
Matthew effect [30].  Those with the most power and 
professional reputation tend to accumulate even more power and 
reputation because of their ability to shut-out or over-ride the 
concerns of transient researchers.   It is not uncommon, for 
example, for the principal investigators on research projects to 
insist that they are afforded first author status on all papers 
generated as a result of their project.  This may be required even if 
their actual contribution was minimal.  Most journals and 
academic outlets have strict rules on how authorship is to be 
decided but such policies and procedures must always work on 
the honour system.   
This set of interrelated issues make seeking employment in 
academia a high-stress game of obtaining research funding, rolled 
into the dominant paradigm of ‘publish or perish’, within an 
environment where demand is vastly oversupplied and career 
stability may be as limited as ‘the next three years’. This has 
created an environment where academia is often no longer 
considered a viable and attractive career destination, with a 
resultant brain-drain to the private sector.   Some in America 
argue persuasively that the position of university professor is no 
longer considered to be a middle class profession7.  The American 
academic system in particular is full of examples of adjunct 
professors living on food stamps and picking up a few classes per 
semester to scratch out a subsistence wage8.  While it is true that 
many of these adjuncts are working in fields where employment 
prospects across the board are weaker, it doesn’t change the fact 
that those considered expert enough to teach and research are not 
always considered worthy enough to offer legitimate career 
stability.    The effect is to create an ongoing, inexorable attrition 
where your willingness to play against a stacked deck is as 
important as your ability to do the job itself.   There is little 
economic incentive for a principal investigator, or even an 
institution, to address this head-on.  The cost associated with 
exacerbating a condition of long-term burn-out won’t be felt 
within the limited constraints of a single research contract.  By the 
time the worst of the mental toll will be felt, it’s highly likely it’ll 
be someone else’s problem entirely. 
5. Sociological and Physical Accessibility 
The final issue to be discussed in this paper is that of accessibility 
– the degree to which technology, facilities and information can 
be used by people with extraordinary requirements.  Generally, 
this can be broken down into two categories of accessibility – 
sociological accessibility, and physical accessibility.  These 
7 https://www.guernicamag.com/features/the-teaching-class/  
8 For example, see the discussion of this issue in 
http://www.salon.com/2014/09/21/professors_on_food_stamps_
the_shocking_true_story_of_academia_in_2014/, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kate-quick/professor-working-
poor_b_4645217.html and 
https://www.insidehighered.com/blogs/confessions-community-
college-dean/adjuncts-food-stamps  
 
terms apply equally to all kinds of modern resources, from 
government services to computer programs to vehicles.  Within 
this paper, we will primarily refer to the accessibility of computer 
programs and research data sets, as it is that aspect of the concept 
that is more relevant to our purposes. 
Whether due to cultural constraints, perceived stigma, or general 
disinterest it is often the case that certain technological and 
societal trends are not accorded equal value within different 
groupings. The degree to which factors internal to these 
technologies and trends permit generally equal participation 
defines its sociological accessibility.   The way in which certain 
things are presented or contextualised however can greatly impact 
on how an individual chooses to perceive its worth.   Technology 
is rarely truly apolitical and often demonstrates the underlying 
cultural assumptions of its creators[7][25].   Consider for example 
the issues of male versus female wish fulfilment represented by 
many video games [12], and consider how the way in which 
explicitly gendered protagonists may appeal, or otherwise, to 
groups of men and women.  Consider the cultural connotations of 
colour choice in children’s toys.  Traditionally this is blue for 
boys and pink for girls.  Consider how that impacts on the choice 
of early play for both children and their parents, and the stigma 
that may be experienced by obviating cultural norms.  
Sociological accessibility is a deep and important topic, and one 
to which we will hopefully return in a later discussion of the 
scandal. 
More pertinent to this particular case study is the issue of physical 
accessibility – when someone has overcome whatever sociological 
barriers may have been in the way, and actively wishes to engage 
with technology.    While things have gotten much better in recent 
years, it is still the case that software is often inaccessible to 
people with physical and mental handicaps.  Blind users often 
find screen-reader technology works well for the most part.  
However, such technology has occasional missteps as a result of 
software not being designed to work with standard tools such as 
JAWS.  Users who are colour blind may find that they are unable 
to distinguish visual cues when the only differentiating factor is 
the colour (for example, a green cursor that turns red, or red 
warning text).  Where sound is used to deliver important interface 
information, deaf users are often disadvantaged, especially when 
viewing videos without subtitles.  Users with mobility 
impairments may find that software requires too much fine-
grained movement, or too many simultaneous key-presses, or is 
simply tiring to use with non-standard interaction devices such as 
head-wands or mouth-sticks.  The more intensely interactive a 
piece of software is, the more these issues become important and 
the more difficult it becomes to truly compensate for all 
interaction regimes.  For most desktop software packages 
interaction is not intense and does not come in short bursts.  For 
these packages inaccessibility tends to be an oversight or as a 
consequence of a lack of awareness of the issues.  However, for 
some highly interactive software packages, such as video games, 
the problem may be more difficult to fully address [14]. 
Large corporations can afford to have dedicated developers whose 
sole job is to work on accessibility.  Small projects, open source 
or otherwise, tend to be mostly auteured products.  Research 
software in particular, especially that written for a particular 
project or research team, can rarely muster development time 
beyond the lifespan of the funding [17].  It is primarily written to 
test a concept or fulfil an immediate need. Such software is only 
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incidentally accessible unless explicitly written for the purposes of 
accessibility research (c.f.  [15][16]).     
In our case study, our postgraduate student has encountered an 
inaccessible piece of research software.  The additional logistical 
overhead this creates has put restrictions on his operating 
flexibility.  He could only access the research data that other 
people could provide for him.  We already know from earlier 
articles in the study that the set of people who had any access to 
the data was highly restricted.   Such constraints make full, 
effective oversight of data and its analysis extremely costly, 
extremely time-consuming, and likely to be de-emphasised in an 
environment where other, more pressing needs had to be 
immediately serviced.  We know that the postgraduate students 
were engaged in teaching, seminar work and marking for 
Blackbriar – all of these come with deadlines, oversight, and 
committee work.   Ensuring the utmost veracity of already trusted 
data may have been a luxury that simply could not be afforded in 
the context of the working environment. 
There is much that can be done to ensure accessible software but 
it requires both the will to invest the effort and the skill-sets to 
make structural changes to the underlying programming code.   In 
many research environments, we cannot assume either – software 
is not being written as production ready products, but instead as 
stop-gap solutions that meet an immediate, but likely non-
persistent need.   Sometimes, temporary software solutions evolve 
into a core element of an organisational workflow, but there are 
inertial pressures that come into play when the need comes for 
changes.   Sometimes software is so tightly bound up in its 
original assumptions that making an adjustment requires a 
complete rewrite of the code.  Sometimes the source-code was 
only ever stored in the personal directory of a postdoctoral 
researcher who left the institution ten years ago.  Sometimes the 
institution is no longer subscribed to the development tools that 
were used to create a software solution.  When making 
improvements for accessibility purposes, there is a relatively 
specialised skillset required to make sure that changes don’t have 
an overall negative effect [31].  There is always a reason why 
something shouldn’t be done, and with the maintenance of 
software the reason may be ‘nobody can actually do it’.    The 
fewer people impacted by a problem with the software, the less 
likely it is that the need for change will gather sufficient urgency 
or the critical mass to turn ‘this should be done’ to ‘this is being 
done’.   
With larger software suites which are purchased from commercial 
outlets, we may also be restricted to what can be done within the 
context of an established extra-institutional user-base.   There may 
be thousands, or tens of thousands, of users who all have their 
own views on how the software should be improved.  A larger 
user-pool would mean that accessibility issues were experienced 
by a larger number of people, but they are likely still only a subset 
of the installed user-base.  Economic self-preservation must come 
into play.  A company looking to profit from its users must see to 
the needs of the many before it can justify seeing to the needs of 
the few.  It’s possible to marshal any number of moral and ethical 
arguments as to why software should be made accessible as a first 
priority, but such arguments may not convince an organisation 
dealing with the ongoing triage implied by competition within 
complex and unpredictable economic restrictions.  
Thus, we see situations like this where people ‘find a way’ around 
the issue, often by following a tortuous chain of importing and 
exporting until the right data can be presented in the right way 
with the right level of accessibility.  Such compensations are 
invariably fragile – if any part of the compensatory chain is 
altered, the entire thing may fall apart.  Software changes on a 
regular basis if it has active developers, and these changes can 
often be substantial, such as changing entirely the default 
interaction metaphor; dropping support for whole families of 
tools; or removing the ability to import or export particular 
formats.   Each time a compensatory process is broken, it takes 
time to repair.  It is rare there is no route to accessibility through 
these kinds of improvised solution spaces, but that too 
occasionally happens.   
6. Conclusion 
It is much too early in our case study to make a valid decision as 
to where blame should lie for the problems being encountered by 
the University of Dunglen.   We are already peeling back some of 
the more obvious layers of the case study to see that underneath is 
a tangled web of complicating factors – ethics, in the real world, is 
often messy.  If it were not, we wouldn’t have any difficulty 
working out the right thing to do.  A black and white moral code 
may allow for instant, quick judgements – but a nuanced 
unpicking of the various inter-relating elements means that we 
rapidly end up with a far richer perspective on the way things 
happen.   
In this paper, we’ve discussed a wide range of relevant issues 
which have been introduced by two of the newspaper items in the 
original Scandal in Academia.   We’ve discussed the different 
expectations between academia and industry, and how 
collaborations between the two can transgress ethical boundaries 
of which neither side may be fully aware.  We’ve discussed the 
cognitive biases that cut at the heart of any claim that we are 
simply rational thinking engines – the combination and 
culmination of these biases debunks almost in its entirety the 
fictional construct of homo economicus.   We’ve seen how 
workplace dynamics and the transient nature of many modern 
research contracts creates an environment where meaningful 
oversight is all but impossible.  We’ve also seen that attempting to 
become part of the stable and collegiate family of academics is an 
inherently self-destructive act that undermines the quality of both 
research and the life of researchers.   Leaving all of this aside, 
we’ve also discussed how even with the best will in the world, it’s 
not always possible for those with different accessibility needs to 
meaningfully contribute all they can when the systems they work 
within aren’t designed to support their specific requirements. 
As outlined in the introduction, we make no claim that this is the 
definitive analysis of the two indicated newspaper items.  We seek 
only to offer a lens through which the scandal in academia can be 
contextualised within its broader context.  We seek to demonstrate 
why each of the individual articles opens up wider and deeper 
discussions of the issues of modern ethics and the factors that 
influence them.  We hope that this analysis of the scandal helps 
inform educators looking to use the case study within their own 
courses. 
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